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POLICY-MAKING AND CONNECTIONS TO VIOLENCE:
A CASE STUDY OF INDIA*

Marie Olson Lounsbery and Frederic S. Pearson
Abstract
This paper explores the role of identity-based, or discriminatory, policy in facilitating the
outbreak of ethnopolitical violence in India. A discriminatory policy is the merging of
communal group identity with the state apparatus. It is argued that as the Indian government
enacts policies beneficial or discriminatory to particular identity groups within the country,
other groups feel threatened. Groups who feel disadvantaged by the policy may begin to fear for
their own security and political interests motivating them to rebel. When focusing on Indian
policy and ethnopolitical violence during the period 1945 to 2000, the authors find that,
although there are many cases of seemingly spontaneous episodes of violence, when identitybased policies do occur, they are often followed by violence and/or protest.
Introduction
With the end of the Cold War in the late 1980s, the international system seemed ready to
experience a new era of peace. However, the “New World Order” predicted by then US
President George H. W. Bush turned out to be something quite different. Although the
occurrence of interstate war diminished substantially after 1989, internal conflicts continued to
rage at an alarming rate throughout the world (Wallensteen and Sollenberg, 1999), and to put
pressure on outside powers considering possible intervention. Scholars who once focused their
attention on superpower rivalry now turned to internal war, and more specifically, “ethnic
conflict.”1 An explosion of efforts ensued to find out what causes these highly destructive and
often intractable conflicts, how they can be managed or resolved, and ideally how to detect the
conditions necessary or sufficient for ethno political violence before it breaks out, i.e., “early
warning.”
As researchers attempt to grapple with the complexity of intrastate warfare, we seek to
contribute to our understanding of what conditions trigger violent ethno political outbreaks. We
propose to test, at least in one very large and diverse state, the general hypothesis that ethno
political conflict is often a reaction to governmental policy initiatives or changes. One key
aspect of policy change entails what might be described as inherent discrimination, i.e., moves
designed or structured to benefit one identity group in society at the expense of others. Such a
policy can be viewed as incorporating group identity into state policy. It establishes one group
as higher in status than others, and as a result, creates a need for disadvantaged groups to defend
their status.
Clearly, all government policies are designed to provide something for someone or some
group. It is proposed here though that policy providing systematic advantage to certain
communities, or disadvantage to others, can be viewed as a catalyst for violence. We use the
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term “catalyst” advisedly, since we suppose that other factors fully account for the violence, and
indeed we examine a few of these in relation to policy change.
In constructing policy changes it has been argued that leaders might blunder in trying to
alleviate social conflict through policy reform without fully considering such factors as
economic inequalities, territorial dissatisfaction, the number, relation, size, and location of ethnic
communities, international involvement or support, and the legacies of colonial and political
history. It also has been observed that aggressive and opportunistic leaders take advantage of
such conditions and the bitterness they engender to incite violence for their own political
purposes (Rupesinghe, 1988; Kaufman, 1996; Williams, 1994). One expression of efforts at
policy reform or of opportunism is the enactment of discriminatory measures, regulations, and
legislation.
We seek to determine if, when, and by what sequences such discriminatory policy leads
toward or away from violence, allowing for the fact that “discrimination” can be a subjective
concept, and indeed might even have positive effects if it empowers or “liberates” previously
oppressed groups (often argued in the context of American affirmative action legislation). If a
consistent pattern of outcomes emerges for certain types of policies, such policy initiatives could
be clear signs or signals for those interested in preventing or ameliorating social violence.
However, it is not yet clear what types of policies have predictable effects and under what
circumstances.
Although some studies have hinted at the idea of policy change leading to violent civil
conflict (Gurr, 1996; Stavenhagen, 1996), the violence is often referred to as the by-product of
other factors. Clearly conditions of domestic disruption can condition the ways policies are
perceived. For example, during the American civil war in the 1860s, the effort, however
reluctant, to emancipate slaves, led to reported ethnic backlash among groups recruited or
conscripted to fight in the war; the war’s economic and social dislocations, the high attrition rate
and forced nature of the draft, may have exacerbated this pattern of ethnic and class tension,
leading for example to anti-war riots among the lower classes in ethnically diverse New York
City.
Ideally one would want to conduct a study of discriminatory policy over many nations
and time-periods. However, the necessity of mapping a large body of policy change events and
effects across time dictates a more focused initial approach to one country. India presents an
excellent case for study because of its extensive ethnic diversity, encompassing different and
overlapping tribal, linguistic, religious, and cultural (including caste) identities spread across a
wide and varied geography, with a long history of periodic ethnic uprisings and communal
violence alongside efforts at reform, collaboration and regional or national cohesion. The origin
of much of this communalism in the contemporary context has been traced to forms of indirect
colonial rule, pitting identity groups against each other and utilizing local traditional rulers,
combined with the development of modern nationalism (Pandy, 1990; Barnett, 1976). If we can
better understand the patterns by which these processes subsequently have unfolded in this large
and pivotal democratic state, we can formulate propositions about ethnic violence for further
testing abroad.
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Identity Based Violence
Factors that contribute to interstate war have been documented and tested by many
scholars in the fields of conflict studies and international relations (see Dougherty and
Pfaltzgraff, 1990; Cashman, 1993; Midlarsky, 1989). Unfortunately, quantitative or behavioral
methodologists relatively neglected analysis of civil or internal wars during the Cold War period,
except perhaps for the links between civil and interstate war (Maoz, 1989; Haas, 1968; Rummel,
1968; Tanter, 1966; Zinnes and Wilkenfeld, 1971; Wilkenfeld, 1972). Although this linkage
research continues and has been increasingly helpful to the field in general, it does not reveal
why some countries experience domestic unrest, rebellion, or uprisings and others do not.
Those scholars who focused specifically on intrastate or civil war often dealt with how
these conflicts end and the success or failure of negotiated settlements (Licklider, 1993 and
1995). At a less intense level than civil wars, scholars also have looked at internal conditions of
communal conflict and anti-government rebellion. Perhaps the most extensive work in this area
is that of Ted Robert Gurr (1970; 1993), who argues that rebellion stems from politicized
discontent, a condition he believes arises from relative deprivation.2 Ethnopolitical conflict,
therefore, is motivated by perceived discrimination, and discontent can be exacerbated by
economic or social conditions and mobilized by political entrepreneurs in order for internal
unrest to occur.
Gurr (1996) has taken his Minorities at Risk project further to develop a model for early
warning of identity-based violence that he illustrates using data from 56 Asian minorities. He
has identified what he believes to be risk factors for groups already engaged in serious forms of
rebellion. The factors that would lead to armed violence include: collective incentives, the
capacity for joint action, and external opportunities. In addition to relative deprivation, other
incentives for communal uprising include a loss of collective autonomy and previous experience
of repression by dominant groups, all factors that can relate to or be expressed in governmental
policy.3 The conditions that Gurr identifies as shaping regime responses to collective action are
a history of elite reliance on coercion, duration and strength of the democratic experience, and
the regime’s domestic power and resources. These risk factors, as Gurr (1996) explains, are not
to be used as predictors of violent conflict, but rather can be coded in order to provide a country
with a risk score, similar to our notion of looking at policy change as a catalyst.
Beyond the important concept of relative deprivation itself, the next question is what
causes sufficient discontent or insecurity that individuals would be willing to politicize, mobilize,
and possibly fight to the death? Gurr’s risk factor model is based on discontent forming from
economic, political, and cultural discrimination, as well as a history of state repression or lost
political autonomy. All of these factors can be viewed as some sort of group discrimination.
Although Gurr acknowledges that a major change in the structure of a political regime may be a
factor in violent civil conflict, his model posits that this change provides a window of
opportunity for identity groups that are already experiencing discrimination.
Elaborating on the window of opportunity thesis, we speculate that governmental policy
rather than or in conjunction with institutional change also might spark group discontent/fear and
lead to violence. In a presidential address to the International Studies Association, Gurr (1994),
analyzing conflicts during the 1993-94 period, developed the importance of political changes
within governments as a condition present prior to war. He found that half of the conflicts
occurred after “power transitions” which compromised any one of three different events: a
national upheaval (as defined by Harff, 1986), revolutionary changes in power, or transitions to
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democracy. In addition, these conflicts are more intense than conflicts that do not follow power
transitions. Upheavals, revolutionary power shifts, and democratic transitions all may entail or
relate to specific policy moves, though such moves, of course, can occur without these major
institutional changes. In the Indian context the 1977 parliamentary election, ousting the
Congress Party after Prime Minister Indira Gandhi’s authoritarian and ethnically manipulative
policies, is often seen as a key turning point in the sustenance of Indian democracy (Weiner,
1978). Thus it may not be so much the revolutionary changes in power or institutions per se as
the policies and measures officially adopted before or after the political transition that makes the
situation volatile.
This study, therefore, is designed to determine which of these various types of factors has
the greatest impact on subsequent identity based violence. It seems clear from Gurr’s research
that internal power dynamics are a significant factor, but it is not clear whether they always are a
precondition of violence. Using a case study format on information provided by area specialists,
Stavenhagen (1996) argues that violence may be inherent in the process of state-formation and
nation building. In order to understand the roots of the conflict one has to look at how the
modern state was originally established. A modern state relates to the different ethno-cultural
groups within its borders through constitutional provisions, electoral systems, legislation or
political culture and practice. The nation-state thus often has a dominant identity group (or
related groups) and one or more subordinate identity groups. This creates a struggle by the
lower status group(s) for recognition. Stavenhagen also argues that these conflicts include two
competing notions of the term ‘nation.’ The modern state system requires that nations show a
united front, yet identity groups, when asked to conform or assimilate, often feel stronger loyalty
to their “identity nation.” This can present grave challenges to a large union such as that of the
Indian subcontinent.4
Although Stavenhagen does not present an early warning system as Gurr does, he argues
that in order to overcome the inherently conflictive nature of the nation-state system, states must
abandon their emphasis on assimilation. He further proposes that democratic states are better
able to prevent these types of conflicts because they tend to de-emphasize assimilation and
ethnic politics. However, as India clearly shows, democracy itself might be caught up in the
turmoil of defining group rights and responsibilities and might or might not be able to quell the
tendencies toward violence in specific instances. Thus, Sisk (1996) argues that despite the
attractiveness of democracy as a form of government, it might not always be more peaceful,
particularly in multicultural societies. Democracy, according to Sisk, will create a security threat
when a win at the polls means a physical threat to the minority; this has been seen in recent
years, for example, in fears of an emerging democratically elected Islamic state in Algeria. In
countries where hostilities between competing identity groups are high, the will of the majority
may mean policies of assimilation or extinction. As a result, he discusses the benefits of
consociational approaches (i.e. power sharing) to identity-based conflicts at the national level.
States such as India have experimented with these approaches, in the form of officeholding and educational quotas, with varied and not always peaceful outcomes. Such quotas,
reserved places, and related set-aside policies themselves can become causes of contention,
conflict, or riotous violence. India’s long struggle with policies toward the “scheduled”
classes— “Untouchable” castes—illustrates these outcomes, with other castes periodically
refusing to cooperate in the system (Joshi, 1982). In addition, India has evolved complex and
subtle norms related to assimilation, reflecting a tension between those who went through the
independence struggle for the united homeland and those in regional areas who were then
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expected to submerge their local identities to the national myth.5 One expression of this tension
is in the area of language law, where a system evolved to recognize Hindi as the nominal
national language, but to allow local languages to flourish and to revert to English at times as a
lingua franca. One student of Indian democracy has noted that ethnic separatist movements, as
seen among the Tamils, Sikhs, and Muslims across the years, are to be expected as expressions
of self-determination in multicultural democracies, and that they can be accommodated
depending upon how well the central authority is institutionalized and upon the willingness of
leaders, central authorities, and ruling groups to share power and resources with the mobilized
protesters (Kohli, 1997). Thus a combination of institutional capability and policy reform is seen
as the key to stability.6
As with assimilation, resource distribution can become a crucial bone of contention in
post-colonial societies,7 but how governmental leaders legislate that distribution, again the
expression of or reaction to inequality via policy, is crucial to understanding the causes of violent
civil conflict. Either mass-led or elite-led policy demands can lead to violence despite their
vastly different motivations.
In sum, those who have examined the history of ethnic relations in India have noted
many accommodations and norms aimed at managing tensions even apart from governmental
policy, often quite successfully. Manor (1996, pp.461-462) shows how four different strands of
ethnic identity—religious, language, tribal/caste, and regional tribal—cross-cut in the Indian
context and how Indians tend to give priority to different levels of identity as circumstances
change, thus blurring or diminishing permanent conflict fault lines. The Japanese also have
displayed the ability to combine ethno-cultural traits, for example adopting multiple religious
practices.
Because Indian society is so heterogeneous, and because the country and its
population are so large, people. . .have a wide array of identities available to
them. These include at least three different kinds of caste identities. . ., religious
identities. . .,and identifications with clans and lineages—as well as linguistic,
class, party, urban/rural, national, regional, subregional and local identities, and
sometimes varying types of ‘tribal’ identities too. The crucial point is that Indians
tend not to fix on any one of these identities fiercely and permanently, as groups
in places like Sri Lanka have done. (p. 463)
Discriminatory Policy Change
While cross-cutting identities are reassuring for Indian democratic stability, periodic
scenes of frenzied communal killing, raids, and counter raids still leave us with the question of
when the pattern of live and let live breaks down, when the cross-cutting buffers lose their
cushion, and when polarization becomes more acute. One suspects again that policy moves have
something to do with this timing, along with exogenous or systemic pressures such as economic
change or institutional breakdown.8 Of course as Manor (1996, p. 465) notes, because of the
diversity of ethnic cues, such as Hinduism’s multiple gods and texts, even when politicians try to
enforce disruptive or polarizing policy changes, as in the efforts by the Hindu right to make the
god Ram the pre-eminent deity across all India, there is considerable natural resistance.
Those who have studied Indian ethnic and particularly religious violence present a
pattern of episodic ups and downs (Manor, 1996, pp. 467-468). “These marked fluctuations in
levels of religious violence are intimately connected to the fluidity with which people in India
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shift their preoccupations from one identity to another (p. 467).” But they also at times are
related to policy irritants such as Indira Gandhi’s machinations to weaken ethnic opponents by
dividing them and pitting potential opponents against each other in an overall pattern of power
centralization (Manor, 1996, pp. 471-472).9
Generally, then, this view opens the whole question of the state’s role in fomenting or
diminishing inter-group tensions and violence. This is illustrated in the history of Indian
language policy. As with Manor’s contention about crosscutting identities, it has been argued
that language diversity both within and between Indian states precludes a forced homogenization
and reinforces pluralism. Fearing the possible breakup of the state in the 1950s, Jawaharlal
Nehru resisted Congress pressures to redraw state boundary lines to conform to language
differences; he hoped to avoid secessionist movements by intermixing language groups
throughout. Thus in a sense non-policy change represented a forceful policy to preserve the
newly independent Indian Union. Still, boundaries were occasionally redrawn along linguistic
lines, though according to Manor (1996, p. 466), the other dividing traits among common
language speakers held sway and prevented any single Indian state from moving forcefully for
separation. Group based secessionist movements have formed in the Northeast, Punjab during
the 1980s, and Kashmir, and the state authorities have alternated between sometimes clumsy
repression and halting efforts at reform, sometimes compounding problems as in recent ideas
about enforcing a national identity card system to stifle cross-border tribal infiltration, without
definitively resolving the discontent.
After reviewing the literature, it seems reasonable that certain types of policy change may
in fact be a key to understanding violent civil conflict. Olzak and Tsutsui (1998) link non-violent
protest and violent uprisings to three sets of variables reflecting: world system influences,
national civil rights policies, and the state’s international networks. They predict for example
that declining levels of internal inequality might intensify ethnic mobilization and strife as
threatened groups or classes dig in their heels (they predict this to be the case more in states of
the economic “core” of world politics than in the disadvantaged “periphery”), and that countries
granting more civil liberties might suffer higher levels of ethno political violence, though
perhaps lower levels of non-violent protest, because of the loosening of restraints and repression
(up to a point of satisfaction with greatly expanded rights). Inequality and human rights, of
course, are both subject to policy reforms and allocations. Findings from this multi-national
study (pp. 706-712), though, cast doubt on the hypothesized relationships about effects of
inequality and freedom in the world’s core and periphery, although violence levels in the core
were higher than often predicted by those who merely assume that poverty breeds protest and
rebellion.
This evidence leads us to hypothesize that shifts in governmental policy that either
benefit or threaten a dominant group in a society solidify group reaction; dominant groups
fearing lost ground or subordinate groups fearing extinction and suppression are motivated to
acquire countervailing power, territory, security, etc. (Horowitz, 1985).
Polarization through state policy making can occur in two ways, as we have seen in the
literature: (1) by pretending that group differences do not exist or are unimportant, thereby
seeking to homogenize the society; or (2) by first recognizing different identity groups but then
incorporating those differences into policy in a way which systematically discriminates against
certain groups. In either case, intra-group bonds are strengthened and inter-group bonds are
weakened. The group, or groups, that expect or experience policy discrimination begin to
distance themselves from the dominant group that is seen as benefiting unduly. With distance,
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there tends to be a lack of communication; therefore, barriers are created that make resolving
tensions difficult (Lake and Rothchild, 1996). In societal polarization, groups do not maintain
the crosscutting ties or allegiances that limit conflict potential (Ross, 1993) and have been shown
to be so important for India.
Depending upon circumstances, the supposed advantages provided the dominant group
might cause a fear of extinction or a fear of assimilation in the others. In an analysis of Bolivia,
Albó (1994) argues that society was organized as if everyone belonged to the dominant group;
this created the potential for violent Bolivian conflict by denying the relevance of those who did
not belong to the Hispanic culture. This again is a pattern reminiscent of feared ethnocide and is
a stronger form of fear than that perhaps picked up by Olzak and Tsutsui’s measures. Some
countries, such as Turkey, do not readily recognize the multi-cultural characteristic of their
nation; therefore, policies designed to homogenize the state create fear of fatal assimilation, as
among Kurds and Armenians. Other states’ policies, as in Rwanda and Burundi, are designed
specifically to rid the country, or parts thereof, of one or more identity groups. This obviously
generates a fear of extinction. The two types of fear are not mutually exclusive. Forced
assimilation can also be viewed as a form of extinction. The “bottom line” is that such policies
generate fear that certain identity groups will not be able to survive or thrive within their
homeland (Rothman, 1997).
It is interesting to note that although inter-group violence is still prevalent in India—
indeed in incidents such as the widespread Hindu attacks on Muslims in Gujarat state in the
summer of 2002 as a response to perceived Muslim terror on railroads and in Kashmir and New
Delhi—the general trend appears to have been toward expression of such fears and resentments
mainly in violence directed at the state.
“Diverse groups do not simply vent their anger at the state but often also hold it
responsible for the injustices they seek to address. Hindu nationalists allege that
the central government appeases the Muslim minority; the upper-caste youths
who
immolated themselves in 1990 accused the government of discriminating against
the so-called forward castes. . .; and regional movements demanding greater
rights to self-determination have accused the national government of
discriminatory allocation of resources and undue political interference at the state
level.” (Basu and Kohli, 1997, p. 321).10
Thus, the central government has come to be seen, accurately or not, increasingly as the
repository of policymaking (either direct or indirect) that for better or worse, can affect the
balance among ethnic communities. In the case of rioting against caste emancipation policy, for
example:
“. . .all of these seemingly diverse examples of conflict—over urban jobs and
education, land, and the ritual purity of the village well—do indeed prove to have
much in common. Each in its own way is a dispute over the Indian “social
contract” and the state’s role in enforcing that contract. The issue in these cases
is not so much ‘law and order’ as ‘whose law, whose order.’ (Joshi, 1982, p. 682).
In India as well, the situation is complicated in that,
Many ‘communal’ riots have indeed been precipitated by discord between
provincial and central governments and between local and national
administrators. In other instances. . .community leaders and state representatives
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have worked together to prevent or contain violence. (Basu and Kohli, 1997, p.
322).11
Discriminatory policies might consist of one specific measure or a series or repetition of
enforcement actions, decisions, laws, rules or regulations. Of course as noted, the mere proposal
of such policies might also have its effects. Discussion or adoption of the discriminatory policy
is volatile because of what it symbolizes to the potentially disadvantaged group or groups;
therefore the actual number of policies adopted is not necessarily a factor in predicting violence,
but their sequence and timing might be.
Relative deprivation, economic disparities and hardships, rising expectations and
discontent play a role in magnifying the effects of discriminatory policy change. The key
question is whether the proposed or enacted policy keeps certain members of a society from
obtaining their “rightful” capabilities and aspirations. It is not even necessary that policy reflects
the intent of discrimination for violence to follow; if the policy symbolizes discrimination for the
dominant or subordinate, the group may respond based on threat perception alone. Groups
which are being discriminated against in reference to others or which have been advantaged in
the past but now find their status threatened by social trends or more pointedly by governmental
reforms are more likely to rebel violently than groups that previously had not hoped for or
experienced advancement.
General discontent results from all of these processes particularly when newly
discriminating measures are adopted.12 Such changes will tend to shake up the status quo,
affording or seeming to afford new and special status to some groups; others will experience
threats (physical or existential) and hostility.13 Indian policies aimed at emancipating the
“Untouchables” for example are seen by many traditional elites as threatening the underpinnings
of the entire social system and therefore are strongly resisted even as they are passed into law by
a concerned national parliament and a party system that might depend on a massive vote among
the poor (Joshi, 1982, p.682). Thus, policies that threaten the status quo might be the most likely
to breed not just protest but outright violence, and reactions to such “threatening” policies can
breed strange alliances, as between richer and poorer higher caste Indians.
Obviously, not all ethnically related policy decisions will result in civil violence. Certain
variables would seem to be crucial, especially when incorporated into official policy. As noted,
discriminatory policy changes are those that could systematically advantage one group within a
society and disadvantage another. The key policies likely to have this effect are related to
language, religion, educational, economic (e.g., job access), and political status (such as land
holding and citizenship rights). These variables are not mutually exclusive; a group might feel
that language policy would also disadvantage them politically and economically, for example.
Clearly, policies can involve more than one type of reform at once and do not happen in a
vacuum. Numerous factors might contribute to the adoption of a discriminatory policy or deter
such a policy from adoption. Other factors could either dampen or magnify a policy’s likelihood
of provoking violence. For purposes of comparison, in this analysis we also record nondiscriminatory or non-identity policy changes, both proposed and enacted.
In our analysis we also allow for the possibility that various types of identity-based
policy can have either destructive or constructive effects, and that they can be seen subjectively
as either harmful or beneficial. Therefore, we introduce the concept of “positive discriminatory
policy,” which is taken to mean a tendency to benefit or protect the minority or traditionally
disadvantaged against the majority or traditionally advantaged population in a given
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circumstance. “Negative discriminatory policy” would have the converse effect of protecting or
benefiting the majority or advantaged. We wish to see whether it matters if discrimination is
positive or negative in predicting the probability of violent or non-violent reaction.
Some studies have shown that moves in certain policy domains might breed more
tendencies to violent reaction. Among these, for example, language policy has been cited as
potentially volatile in a state like India. Below we review expectations regarding some of these
domains.
• Language. Often states do not recognize the importance of linguistic differences in
maintaining domestic peace. For example, in countries such as Latvia and Moldova after the
cold war ended, state language reform disadvantaged those, such as Russians, that did not
speak the primary national language or did not consider it their first language. In a
multiethnic society such as India’s with several prevalent languages, national or regional
language legislation and policy carries great portent. Horowitz (1985, p. 219) argues that
when a particular language is provided an exclusive official status it becomes a symbol of
domination and thus presumably a great cause of bitterness and resentment of the type that
can spur violence. Cultural fear of domination may, in fact, play a large role in contributing
to group level rebellion, since group members feel they might lose control of their way of life
(Donnelly, 1996). In a study of India and Northern Ireland, Bostock (1997) identified
“language grief” (the anticipation of or reaction to language loss or extinction) as a major
contributor to conflict. On the other hand, Laitin (1993) finds the potential for fighting over
language, especially in India and he would argue, controversially, Sri Lanka, to be muted
because this issue almost automatically leads to a bargained outcome. It is hypothesized
here, for purposes of study, that because of India’s linguistic diversity and the dampening of
linguistic polarization across Indian states, language policy reform will be less volatile than
other forms of perceived policy discrimination.
• Religion. The processes involving religion and violent civil conflict are similar to those of
language. The same sense of domination and discrimination occurs. With the end of the
Cold War, and the increased interdependent nature of the international system, it seemed
likely that economic concerns would take priority over religious differences. However, some
scholars argue that the societal importance of religion is growing despite increased global
economic interdependence (Bangura, 1994; Haynes, 1995). Reinforcing the salience of
religion in conflict, Reynal-Querol (2002) tested the notion that religiously diverse
multicultural states will be more violence prone than linguistically diverse states, with
findings that religious polarization and anamist diversity (number of followers of anamist
culture) do in fact explain incidence of civil war better than linguistic polarization. It follows
from her work (2001) that consociational policies protecting minorities work better than
majoritarian democracy to keep ethnic cleavages at bay.
Both the aforementioned caste controversy and the Sikh and Kashmir disputes in India show
how aspects of religion and religious practice, as in the controversy and violence surrounding
the sanctity of the Golden Temple of Amritsar, become politicized as forms of nationalism
leading to violence. It is often difficult to determine exactly when a religious movement
becomes a political movement. One must look for various forms of organized resistance,
campaigns or uprisings, the use of sanctuaries, and note the counter tendencies of
government to enforce policies on religious groups. Thus it is hypothesized here that
religious policy, because of its increasing politicization, will be the area of Indian political
life most subject to violent ethnic outbreaks.
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Economic and Political Status. Gurr (1994) has measured economic and political
discrimination as variables that he considers important in studying disadvantaged minorities.
Groups unable to satisfy their needs within the system will seek satisfaction in some other
way. When governmental policy is seen as the source of discrimination, or is blamed for
failing to solve economic ills in a context where scapegoating of other ethnicities is possible,
the result can be inter-ethnic or anti-government violence. Economic and political policies
would include regulations and legislation dictating land and resource rights, employment and
educational opportunities, as well as affecting citizenship or denying autonomy rights.

Various significant political events were included in the study for exploratory purposes.
Because of the economic stresses in a country of India’s size and the still unresolved rights of
minorities in some regions (such as the Northeast), it is hypothesized that economic and political
reforms will follow religion as India’s next most destabilizing policy domain.
It is argued here that discriminatory policies are neither necessary nor sufficient “causes”
of ethno political violence. When seeking to explain such a complex phenomenon, it is
important to recognize that no one factor alone could claim responsibility. Certainly the policy
environment is important to keep in mind when assessing actual policy impact. As a result, the
current study incorporates two policy environmental factors as contextual variables: executive
party shift and economic fluctuation.
Several studies have identified the importance of regime change as a precipitant of civil
violence. As noted earlier, Gurr (1994) included “power transitions” as a strong predictor of
such violence. It seems feasible that such situations might open the door to possible identitybased policy changes as indicated earlier. Similarly, other scholars have focused specifically on
democratization, finding positive correlation between semi-democratic regimes and violence
(Hegre, et al., 2001; Henderson and Singer, 2000; Ellingsen, 2000). India, however, has
remained strongly democratic, for the most part, according to Gurr (1997) and the Polity IV
democracy project. On the other hand, party shifts have occurred. As a result, the policy-toviolence linkage will be explored in relation to executive leadership changes.
In addition, several scholars have identified economic factors, and particularly downturns
as important in explaining the incidence of civil violence. Stringent economic conditions
exacerbate inter-group tensions and governmental resentments over scarce employment
opportunities. Indeed, Kaufman (1996) has argued that one cannot motivate economically
satisfied people to rebel. Logically, as state resources become scarce, the threat of ethno
political violence is more probable. Further, we might expect governments to enact more
discriminatory policies during economic down cycles as individuals within government seek to
secure constricting resources for their own identity group. As a result, the policy-to-violence
linkage will also be analyzed in relation to India’s economic fluctuations.
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Research Methodology
Ethno political violence among groups and by and against the government constitutes the
dependent variable in this study. Incidents of civil violence as well as various discriminatory
policy changes in India were culled from US State Department country reports, as well as from
the Political Handbook of the World, and Keesing’s Contemporary Archives Online. We chose
to combine sources in order to reduce single source bias in scholarship and media reports and to
maximize reported events through triangulation. However, we recognize that these all three are
Western sources and as such potentially might miss or distort the extent or subtext of Asian
events. However, Keesing’s, the source that produced the largest number of accounts, has
through the years tended to specialize in Afro-Asian politics, and presents unusually detailed and
thorough reports.14
Our data collection approach involved searching sources for any incident of ethnically
related economic, social or political policy change and/or incidents of political violence within
the state; thus the units of analysis for this study entail event sequences. Once identified, the
sequence of events surrounding the episode of violence or policy change (or both if they
occurred as predicted) was coded. For comparative purposes, we also coded sequence of events
surrounding mass-based political protest. For example, if a report in Keesing’s relayed the
information that violent riots had occurred as a result of protests showing opposition to a
recently enacted language law, the sequence coded would be a discriminatory policy change
followed by protest and ethno political violence. As one can imagine, there are many event
sequence possibilities in such a project. These possibilities include cases where a discriminatory
policy change did not involve violence, where ethno political violence occurred without policy
change, as well as cases where the two occurred in sequence. 15
Reports surrounding such events for three months time were then coded to reveal
sequences whereby policy initiatives, protests, and violence either did or did not follow each
other.16 Thus it was possible to specify policies that were preceded or followed by protest or
rebellion or state repression and those that were not. Likewise we identified acts of protest or
violence (e.g., assassinations or hate crimes) that were or were not related to ethnic policy
moves. If ethno-cultural violence or protest were not preceded by a detectable policy move, the
case would be coded as ‘no political event’ followed by identity-based violence in the form of
riot, etc. Thus we were able to specify violence that did not appear to stem from governmental
policy moves as well as that which did. The goal of such coding methods is to eliminate
spurious coding association. Admittedly, the sequence determinations are based upon second
hand reports typically from journalists in the field. Such reports may be subject to bias or
misinformation. It can be argued, however, that the benefit of the closer association coding
mechanisms employed here outweigh the threat of bias or misinformation.
Record was made of all reported mass-based acts of civil violence, identity-based policy
changes, and political protests, organized strikes, or demonstrations between the period 1947 and
2000. We also recorded major economic crises or downturns as a contextual variable when
noted in the sources identified above. In dealing with violence, we were not concerned with any
particular casualty threshold, but rather with violent reaction or outbursts that could entail riots,
bombings, armed attacks, acts of terrorism, etc.
The label “discriminatory” is used if a policy, regulation, or official governmental act
affects ethno-cultural status, as in language, religion, culture and culturally-based political rights,
economic and resource allocations. Thus measures regarding the status of language, religion,
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citizenship, employment, political participation and cultural/regional autonomy can be
considered as positively or negatively discriminating. As noted we coded for proposed as well
as implemented policies. For heuristic purposes, then, a national policy that declared Hindi the
state language would be coded negatively (i.e. from the viewpoint of the minority). On the other
hand, a policy that provided autonomy for a certain minority group, or which allowed for
multiple language use would, in most circumstances, be coded positively. Both, however, are
examples of discriminatory policy changes and could result in violence, either by the
disadvantaged minority or by the embittered or insecure majority or by the government.
Therefore, we will analyze cases where either negative or positive policy changes, or both, might
have set off violence.17
Coding episodes of violence in India over more than 50 years is challenging. For
example, violence of a certain type can recur several times. Certain regions of the country, such
as Jammu and Kashmir and the Northeast, also can be viewed as having episodes of violence
repeatedly and nearly continuously for years at a time. In such cases, the outbreak of violence or
a renewed outbreak after a lull was considered a new event to be coded. On the other hand,
ongoing or repeated battles in these areas were not coded as separate new events.18 Finally, as
noted, we recorded cases with non-violent outcomes if we found a prior ethno-political policy or
protest. We assume that any other non-violence outcome, say following no policy moves, is not
pertinent to this study.
Contextual variables included in the study are executive leadership change and economic
fluctuation. Executive leadership change is considered to have occurred when there was a
change in the position of prime minister. This information is available through the Indian
Embassy at www.indiaembassy.org. In order to assess the proposed policy-to-violence
relationship and leadership change, a series of figures are utilized identifying when
discriminatory policies occurred in relation to leadership change. In order to identify a possible
connection between party shift and the policy-to-violence linkage, the figures included below
also make the distinction between a party shift versus a prime minister shift when they are
different.
Economic fluctuation is analyzed in a similar fashion. In order to effectively identify the
ups and downs of India’s economy, we measure percent change in gross domestic product from
previous year. These figures are derived from International Financial Statistics.19 This variable
is analyzed with the more reliable policy change data for the years 1960-2000.
Findings
Project data collection resulted in 200 cases of significant political events (or related
events in a series) or episodes of violence.20 During the 1947-2000 period, we found 79
instances (outbreaks or renewals) of ethno political violence in India, where violence came
either as the first incident or as a direct result (specified or indicated in the accounts) of a
policy or a single precipitating event. We found an additional 25 cases where violence came as
the end result of a long chain of events, including ethnic policies or protests, constituting what
we called “subsequent violence.” Twenty of these latter cases were identity-based violence,
and five were non-identity based.
Contrary to the study’s basic hypothesis of a firm link between discriminatory policy
moves and violence, of the 79 original violent incidents, 48 (61%) were preceded by ‘no
event,’ meaning they could be associated directly with no particular policy change or political
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event, ethnic or not. Many of these seemingly spontaneous incidents appeared to be related to
general patterns of violence within the country. For example, there were several entries related
to Hindu-Muslim fighting that might have originated because of friction in the streets or over
issues such as disrespect of religious holy places (especially mosques). Another source of such
episodes dealt with violence against lower social group or caste members, particularly the
Harijans or Untouchables.
In some instances such vengeful fighting or communal attacks could have related to
prior objectionable policies. Some disputes regarding the use or building of religious
institutions, for example, could relate to older prevailing governmental policies and regulations
or to the lack of policy reform, regulation, or enforcement to protect the religious community’s
interests. However, if we could not identify a specific proximate policy initiative, we did not
code for the relevance of such older policies and practices or for policy failures or omissions.
Of the 31 initial identity-based violent incidents preceded by detectable policy moves,
only eight (26%) were preceded by discriminatory policy changes, either positive or negative.
An additional three events of ethno political violence were preceded by proposed
discriminatory policies that were not yet adopted. Thus, in all less than 40% of original violent
mass based incidents had discriminatory policy antecedents. Interestingly, nine (29%) of the
identity-based violence episodes were first protests or demonstrations that then became violent,
so that protests seemed about as likely as policy changes to lead to or warn of violence.
Obviously, factors such as police responses to such demonstrations can affect the turn to
violence. Various other events, such as a reported arrest, death or assassination, as well as
migration patterns preceded the remainder of initial violent incidents.
Looking at the 25 cases of “subsequent violence,” i.e., violence coming after a longer
sequence of events, we found that eight (32%) were preceded by some form of identity policy
initiative (whether positive, negative, or “neutral”). Nine resulted from prior governmental
repression, while 11 (44%) were preceded by some form of identity protest. Of course since
these are sequences, a given act of violence could have been related to a combination of the
above factors. The most common such sequence (four cases) was for discriminatory policy to
lead to subsequent protest and then to violent outbreaks.
Thus, on the whole and looked at from the standpoint of violence, discriminatory policy
changes preceded the outbreaks in only about one third to two-fifths of the cases. Looked at
from the standpoint of discriminatory policy, however, there was a higher frequency of
subsequent violence. In all there were 40 cases of discriminatory policy in the data, both
negative and positive (one case neutral) in India during the years under study. Interestingly and
perhaps indicating India’s democratic tendencies, the majority of those cases were of the
positive variety (28 cases or 70%). It seems apparent that the Indian national or state
governments have repeatedly attempted to alleviate identity-based tension via various sorts of
positive discriminatory policies or reforms. For example, there were many examples of
devolution, such as providing full statehood for Himachal Pradesh, Manipur, Tripura and
Meghalaya in 1970, as well as examples of policy designed to recognize languages other than
Hindi at the state level.
Recall our assumption that positive discrimination will have more salutary effects on
violence than negative discrimination. Of the 28 cases of positive discriminatory policy, the
majority (17 or 61%) was not followed by violence or protest. Positive discrimination led to
identity-based protest in eight cases (29%) and to identity violence in only three instances
(11%). In three more cases a sequence beginning with positive discrimination led through
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several subsequent events to violence. However, as seen in Table 1, the fact then that some
40% of the time angry mass response appears likely even after “positive” policy reforms should
give decision-makers pause.
Table 1
Positive Discriminatory Policy Change
28 of 40 (70%) discriminatory policy changes were positive in nature
8 of 28 (29%) positive policies were followed by identity-based protest
3 of 28 (11%) positive policies were followed by ethno political violence
Negative policy discrimination had somewhat more destabilizing effects. Twelve of the
discriminatory policies were coded as negative,21 and unlike positive discrimination nearly twothirds of these instances were followed either by ethno political violence or political protest.
Indeed violence occurred in five instances (42%) with protest coming in three more (25%) cases.
Thus violence was a relatively more frequent outcome for negative than for positive
discrimination. While a variety of factors might contribute to ethno political violence, it seems
clear (Table 2) that when negative policy discrimination does occur, it tends to be followed
rather predictably (two-thirds of the Indian cases) by violence and/or protest. Indeed the violent
effects were rather immediate in the case of negative discrimination, not going through long
sequences or chains of events.
Table 2
Negative Discriminatory Policy Change
12 of 40 (30%) discriminatory policies were negative in nature
3 of 12 (25%) of negative policies were followed by identity-based protest
5 of 12 (42%) of negative policies were followed by ethno political violence
Several conflicts theorists (Sisk, 1996; Horowitz, 1985) have discussed the
possibility of devolution and federalism as a means of effectively dealing with such
heterogeneous societies as India. The fact that India has made serious efforts to localize
government for that reason, and yet still experienced high levels of identity-based violence raises
questions about the assumed benefits of devolution, or about whether the correct policies were
engaged. Devolution generally would be considered positive in our categorization, and as such
perhaps did not often lead directly to violence, but it also did not preclude violence arising from
negative policies in the realm. Even when the national government provided local control and
went through the pains of creating separate linguistic states, such as those in the Punjab
Reorganization Bill of 1966, violence continued to be seen (e.g., in Punjab and New Delhi). It
seems that devolutionary policies can have the effect of creating “minorities within minorities”
or even generating majorities who perhaps do not see the need to accommodate yet another
linguistic community. Yet in other circumstances, the subdivision of states into still smaller
autonomous units might well relieve some of these tensions.
Further research is, therefore, needed focusing specifically on the benefits and drawbacks
of devolution, decentralization, of power sharing in diverse populations. Although positive
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discriminatory policies did in some cases lead to violence, they appeared to do so less frequently
than their negative counterparts. There were eight cases of proposed discriminatory policies,
with seven of them of the ‘positive’ variety. Five of the eight (63%) resulted in eventual
violence and an additional two in identity-based protest. Proposed events thus appear to be even
more volatile than their enacted counterparts, perhaps because groups become alarmed and take
the occasion to campaign against adoption through violent means.
On four occasions discriminatory policy actually followed rather than preceded violence
or protest. For example, in Assam, 1960 linguistic riots led to a decision to make Assamese the
official language of the state. In two other instances previously objectionable policy was
reversed after protests. This type of sequence, however, was less prevalent than one might have
assumed, and therefore indicates that the relationship between policy and violence tends to be
uni-directional, i.e., to lead from policy to violence or protest. Indian authorities may have
proven less responsive in policy terms to popular outcry or uprising than democratic theory
might predict. Over time and given repeated incidents of communal violence, local or national
governments might revert to old “learned” responses, might become less open to reform, or
might adopt new approaches to policing or enforcement.
We must note that “governmental policy” in India implies either national or regional
(state) policies. We might wonder whether one or the other is more prone to produce violent
reaction or opposition, especially in light of the devolution hypothesis. Therefore, we separated
out our discriminatory policies according to their regional content, listing regionally based
policies, national policies with regional content, and national policies.22 In Table 3 we show
quite clearly that regionally oriented identity policies, whether passed by states or national
authorities, are more likely to generate violence than are national policies. It could be that such
regional policies are meant to deal with more intractable difficulties and more entrenched
violence to begin with, and therefore are more violence prone, or that they are in and of
themselves more controversial and threatening to minorities. Further study of this question will
be required.
Table 3
Sources and Focus of Discriminatory Policies
Total

Led to
Violence
7
2

Regional Policies
17
National Policies with
10
Regional Content
National Policies
16
1
Chi-square = 15.50, significant < .01

Led to
Protest
3
3
6

During the data collection and analysis it became apparent that language policy has been
a volatile issue in Indian history, but our hypothesis was that it would not be the most volatile of
the policy domains. There were 27 event sequences having to do with language issues, including
12 linguistic discriminatory policy changes and five proposed discriminatory policy changes. Of
those policies enacted (Table 4), 10 were positive in nature with seven of those followed by
ethno political violence and an additional three by identity-based protest. This illustrates the

35

Peace & Conflict Studies

Olson Lounsbery & Pearson

numerous governmental attempts in India to give representation to the many linguistic groups
within the country, and the fact that positive policy changes produced markedly less linguistic
violence than proposed or negative changes. In fact, there were only two cases of negative
linguistic policy with both experiencing ethno political violence in their aftermath. Further,
there were five proposed linguistic policies with three followed by violence.
Table 4
Linguistic Discriminatory Policy Change

Followed by ethno
political violence
Total DPC

Positive
Linguistic DPC
4
(40%)
10

Negative
Linguistic DPC
2
(100%)
2

Proposed
Linguistic DPC
3
(60%)
5

By comparison, there were seven cases of religious discriminatory policy changes
(three negative and four positive in nature). Only two cases (one negative) were followed by
ethno political violence, and another two (one negative) by protest. Surprisingly not only are
religious policies apparently less frequent in India, but they are also seemingly less volatile
than their linguistic counterparts.
The majority of the identity-based policies identified in the study were considered
economic and/or political in nature (although there was some overlap where a particular policy
might be considered both economic/political and either linguistic or religious if the policy
legislated several benefits). There were a total of 30 economic/political discriminatory
policies. Of those, 22 were positive in nature. These policies were the least volatile (Table 5),
with only three leading to ethno political violence and five leading to protest. On the other
hand, four of seven negative economic/political policies were followed by ethno political
violence. An additional negative economic/political policy was followed by protest.
Table 5
Economic/Political Discriminatory Policies

Followed by ethno
political violence
Followed by
protest
Total DPC

Positive
Economic/Political
DPC
3
(13.6%)
5
(22.7%)
22

Negative
Economic/Political
DPC
4
(57%)
1
(14%)
7
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All discriminatory policy types, and particularly the “negative” ones, have been shown to
result in ethno political violence at least some of the time. On the other hand, despite our initial
expectations for India, linguistic policies appear more volatile than their religious or
economic/political counterparts.
It has been hypothesized that resource disparities play a significant role in accelerating
ethno political conflict. When focusing on discriminatory policy changes, this variable seems
theoretically relevant. When resources are scarce, identity groups may feel the need to secure
them for their group more so than when the economy is prosperous and healthy. Data collection
indicates 12 cases of events considered to entail economic downturns as reported by project
sources. Four (33%) of those were related to non-identity protest—for example, the left-wing
trade union strike in 1967 protesting rising prices and unemployment—and three (25%) were
related to non-identity violence (i.e. food riots). Some cases of ethno political violence occurred
during the same year as these economic declines, however we were unable to establish direct
relations between the two event types.23 These findings do not, however, provide a systematic
analysis of the relationship between economic fluctuation and the policy change-to-violence
linkage as proposed earlier.
In order to better make this assessment, Figure 1 is presented for the years after 1960, and
identifies policy changes that were and were not followed by ethno political violence. These
changes were graphed in relation to percent change in GDP from previous year (the first year
had no reference point). In addition, the graph also indicates these changes and economic cycles
in relation to party and prime minister shifts.
Figure 1
Leadership Change, Economic Fluctuation, and Discriminatory Policies
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Intriguingly, incidents of discriminatory policy change (DPC) which were followed by
violence seemed to come at relatively extreme points of economic change, i.e., either upward
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economic shifts of over four percent, or downward shifts. However, contrary to expectations,
the upward shifts appeared more subject to such policy linkage to violent outbreaks than the
downward shifts were (note that violence occurred in India nearly every year, so that the
indicators are for the policy-violence sequence, and not for all occurrences of violence). All
instances of policy change NOT followed by violence during this period also occurred in the
better economic times, with some of the non-violent outcomes coming coincidentally in the same
year as the violent ones. Overall, then, one is hard pressed to conclude that economics made
much difference. Bad economic times did seem, however, to correspond to the possibility of
violence following discriminatory moves, and not to the policy-non-violent outcomes.
As for political changes, the first two prime ministerial changes and the first party shift
were followed rather closely by ethno political policies and subsequent violence. However, this
pattern was not as clear for later governmental shifts, either of party or leadership, and it could
have been that in the early years the nation’s first ethno political policies were being enunciated
and coincidentally that prime ministers finally changed (after the long Nehru reign). During the
more conservative shift of the 1980s and 1990s, there may indeed have been a great deal of
“ethnic politics” going in, especially with Hindu nationalist revival. Yet these evidently did not
necessarily translate predictably into policy moves followed by near term violence. Fears of
ethnic repression or intimidation, however, might have led to an atmosphere leading to
communal fighting, whether associated with specific policies or not.
Implications
It seems clear that discriminatory policy changes in India are not the only source or
trigger of ethno political violence. In fact, the majority of such violent acts seem to occur
rather spontaneously as the result of a street-level disagreement in a pattern of continuing
conflict and vengeance. Future research is required to shed light on these episodes to assist in
reducing the tension and atmosphere that makes spontaneous violence possible. We also have
not distinguished between ethnic violence directed at other groups and at the state, so that we
would want to know more about what triggers one form versus the other.
It is also clear, however, that discriminatory policies, when they do occur, often lead to
violence or identity-based protest, with negative discriminatory and proposed policies proving
considerably more volatile than the positive variety, although opposition to positive policies,
particularly from groups which stand to lose some of their previous advantages or status, can
become violent as well. The potential of violent outbreaks as a result of discriminatory policy
seems to be related to the focus and location of that policy. India’s attempts to strike a balance
with some devolved ethno-related powers and a still strong central government seem to have
created a system in which regional discriminatory policies are more likely to lead to violence
than those adopted at the national level.
Future research comparing Indian policy with other more or less centralized countries
might provide useful insight into this issue and the adequacy of the balance. We have only
been able to highlight what appears to be an interesting difference in central and regional
policy effects. Indian democracy has generated a distinctive and somewhat successful pattern
of positive policy initiatives to deal with the challenges of heterogeneity. Indeed Das Gupta
(1988, p.165) argues cogently from the Assamese example that ethnic struggles are frequently
over who will control the country’s resources and that given enlightened policies at the center
“ethnic regionalism and secular nationalism are not necessarily competing values.”
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Project results illustrate the problematic nature of dealing with a diverse
linguistic population via linguistic policy, especially in comparison to religious discrimination
per se. Such policies and demands often are associated with violence, indicating the sensitive
nature of language and the importance of language recognition. Again, cross-country
comparative analyses are necessary to explore methods of appeasing several linguistic groups
without the problem of creating a “within minority.”
If discriminatory policy is a catalyst of violence, it is evidently not as
intertwined with other factors as one might have assumed. For example, one factor commonly
linked to ethnic violence, economic downturns, seemed at least as likely to be related to nonidentity based policies, demonstrations, and violence. The sequences whereby discriminatory
policy led to violence, at least in our data, generally were not very long, with the most common
sequence being policy leading to protest leading to violence. However, negative policy per se
seemed quite capable of directly generating violent uprisings. Therefore, such policy, whether
proposed or implemented, bears watching by those interested in early warning or amelioration
of ethnic violence. Again, one would want to see the patterns in other states, but India affords
an important initial validation, especially as regards the incendiary potential of linguistic
policies.
Endnotes
* We would like to thank Emily Kanaga, Sonja Mann, Bappaditya Mukherjee, and Mayuko
Shimakage for their excellent research assistance, and Dr. Kousar Azam for her encouragement,
advice, and support. We would also like to thank Steven Cohen for his comments on an earlier
version. The authors remain solely responsible for the content.
1

We use the term “ethnic” or “ethnopolitical” conflict and violence in this paper to denote
fighting over issues related to cultural identity. This can encompass disputes regarding group
identity, nationalism, language, religion, citizenship and other aspects of culture such as myths,
traditions, and norms. It overlaps with but is treated as distinct from disputes over other issues
such as ideology, territorial control and power that might not have an ethnicity component.
2
The idea of relative deprivation, translated from the individual to the group level, is seen as a
discrepancy between a group’s value expectations and what the group is actually able to achieve.
3
Factors in a group’s capacity for sustained collective action are the strength of the group’s
identity and group mobilization. Factors affording a group the opportunity to initiate
ethnopolitical rebellion include recent major changes in the structure of the political regime and
support from kindred groups in neighboring countries. Where Gurr focuses on the interaction of
many structural and institutional factors in assessing risk of internal civil conflict and
Stavenhagen looks at the nation-state system, Stuart J. Kaufman (1996) argues that hostile
masses, belligerent leaders, and inter-ethnic security dilemmas drive internal ethnic warfare.
“They reinforce each other in a spiral of increasing conflict: belligerent leaders stoke mass
hostility; hostile masses support belligerent leaders; and both together threaten other groups,
creating a security dilemma which in turn encourages even more mass hostility and leadership
belligerence” (Kaufman, 1996: 109). Kaufman also makes a distinction between wars initiated
by dominant groups, which he terms ‘popular chauvinism’ (mass-led) and ‘government
jingoism’ (elite-led), and those initiated by subordinate groups, or ‘mass insurgencies’ (massled) and ‘elite conspiracy’ (elite-led).
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While they may pose challenges for multi-ethnic states, Barnett and other scholars of India
note that separatist movements need not be incompatible with national integration, providing
that integration is not seen as synonymous with homogenization and that cultural pluralism is
genuinely accepted (Brass, 1981, p. 452).
5
One area of inter-ethnic coexistence in the religious domain is the general Indian pattern of
tolerance in return for acceding to the basically Hindu social order. Hindus have come to
expect this in relation to the ancient absorption of Buddhism, and it created difficulties relative
to the Sikhs in the 1980s (Mahmood, 1989).
6
Horowitz (1985) and Kaufman (1996) join scholars such as Merton (1957) and Gagnon
(1995) in enunciating what has been termed the “instrumentalist” view of civil violence, in
which national elites are seen to exploit group antagonisms for concrete political or territorial
gains. An alternative conception is the so called “primordialist” view that most ethnopolitical
conflicts are rooted either in human nature as deep-seated tribal hatreds (Huntington, 1996) or
long evolving cultural suspicions and rivalries. For example, Barber (1995) argues that
“tribes” who are at war with each other are trying to redraw boundaries in order to further
divide the international system. Despite assumptions about tribal hatreds, however, ethnic
differences appear to play a relatively small role in the onset and resolution of violent
international disputes (Huth, 1995). Singer (1993) has begun to explore the validity of the
primordialist view on intrastate conflict, and finds that “cultural difference does not necessitate
conflict; rather, it only makes it easier for elites to move their societies closer to hostility and
rivalry” (Henderson, 1997). Singer (1996) also argues that to dismiss these intrastate conflicts
as tribal hatreds is dangerous if not patronizing, and prematurely assumes that we already know
what the conflicts are about. Such conflicts are complex processes about real issues that need
further analysis, as seen in Subrate K. Mitra’s (1995) critique of Asghar Engineer’s (1994)
thesis that “ethnicity derives its strength from primordial identity,” while in India Muslims
have made relatively successful political alliances with former Hindu untouchables. By
contrast, Dutt’s (1976) instrumentalist and pro-Congress analysis of the Indian constitutional
crisis blamed political and opposition agitators for combining anti-democratic themes with
ethnic hatred to gain power for themselves and bring down both the government and
democratic structures.
7
The added dimension of economic dislocation and modernization as well as class-based
politics inevitably comes into discussions of ethnic or identity conflict. Based on case studies
in Asia, Africa, and the Caribbean, Horowitz (1985) generates a theory of group entitlement
and inter-group comparison, arguing that differential modernization based on ethnicity is an
important factor for understanding the collective psychology of identity conflicts. He argues
that the “modernization gap” and elite ambitions taking advantage of accompanying
psychological tensions have resulted in post-colonial states where elites have the ability to turn
group fears and resentment into mass antagonism and war. Modernization theory entails the
belief that ethnic groups modernize at differential rates, and as a result, there is inter-group
competition for benefits. The uneven distribution of economic and educational resources,
according to Horowitz, is an important source of group tensions. One might also speculate that
economic hardships, and their differential effects on various dominant or subordinate groups,
can hasten the resort to force.
8
Indeed one type of institutional arrangement militating against inter-ethnic violence might be
the form of “civic engagement” in crosscutting associations and groups that tend to break down
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polarization. This has been seen among Hindu’s and Muslims in cities where violence has
been minimized or abated (Varshney, 2001, noting that most Indian civil violence takes place
in cities rather than in India’s myriad of villages). However, there are conditions where these
consultative networks and associations might not suffice, as in the former Yugoslavia, either
because the associations are not prominent, large, and well enough organized or because they
are overtaken by events.
9
Citing a study by Oldenburg (1993) Manor notes that Indian communal (religious) incidents
peaked in the mid 1960s, and despite a general rise in the 1980s did not approach those levels
again up to 1990. Others have noted a marked increase again in the 1990s, however.
10
Indeed Basu and Kohli note the irony that this trend has coincided with the
“deinstitutionalization” of the Indian state, i.e., the fall of previous pillars such as secularism,
socialism, and Congress Party democracy and the deterioration of civil and political
bureaucracies. The electorate has multiplied and competition over resources distributed by the
state has intensified along with inter-party competition and grassroots democracy. They further
note that state policy can be either direct and intended or indirect and unintended in its impact
on subsequent protest and violence. Indeed state inaction in key situations can also be a form
of policy by default.
11
These authors also note (pp. 323-324) that ethno cultural identities themselves change and
transform over time, especially as transformed into political movements that wax and wane.
Again the role of the state and political leaders is considered crucial in negotiating such
changes.
12
We presume that although mere proposals for adoption might also spark violence, crowds
and groups react more vehemently to actual regulations in place than to plans and proposals,
since discussion of various approaches is always taking place and policy does not become
really “serious” until it is approved and on the way to implementation.
13
In cases where there is a complete state breakdown, where no policies could be made,
presumably the discriminatory policy change could have occurred prior to the breakdown and
may have served as a catalyst to that fact.
14
Since Keesings Contemporary Archives Online was only available from 1960-2000, for the
earlier years we supplemented the data with the Political Handbook of the World (1998).
However, since the latter is not as comprehensive as Keesings, the findings before 1960 must
be treated as reliable but less authoritative than for the 1960-2000 period. Separate analyses
were completed for the latter period for comparison with the entire period, 1947-2000, but the
findings did not change substantially.
15
While one would also want to account for the outcome “no policy reform-no violence” the
event data approach we utilize at present does not afford that as a practical measurement since
those are essentially “non-events.” One could alternatively deal with “country or event years”
and code zeros for years with no such activity, but the effort here was to go to the event level
itself in order to see sequences by which action and reaction in the policy-violence nexus
actually occur. At the initial stage of investigation it is important to look closely at these
sequences in order to induce theoretical propositions for further systematic testing.
16
If outcomes and effects were noted beyond three months, and were clearly related in the
account to policy initiatives, they were coded as well.
17
Obviously groups can interpret a policy in widely contrasting ways, and a certain subjectivity
is inherent in such coding. Language laws may validate one community and invalidate its
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neighbors; U.S. affirmative action is seen as just in some quarters and discriminatory in others.
However we treated such policies as negative if their effects were highly unbalanced or
unfavorable to minorities.
18
The reasoning for such a decision is two-fold: first, reports of specific violent regional
episodes tend to be sporadic and rarely detailed (for example, a report of ‘continued violence in
Kashmir’ provides very little insight into the level of violence or its circumstances), and
secondly, the project is concerned with identifying potential causes of violent outbreaks (hence
its potential usefulness in “early warning”) as opposed to continuous episodes. As a result,
initial and renewed (after a distinct lull of at least a year in reports) instances of violence were
the focus of data collection. There is one particular exception. Hindu/Muslim communal
violence is a recurring Indian problem, and can take a number of forms. The difficulty in
identifying this violence as ‘continual’ is that it rarely occurs only in a specific region, so that
one does not know whether reports of violence in various regions is part of a single conflict or
indicative of several conflicts. Therefore, if we did not know enough about the particular
circumstances to say it was or was not a continuation of prior local fighting, this type of
violence was coded as a new event whenever it was reported.
19
Volume 2001 was used to identify percent change in GDP from previous year for the years
1971-2000. Volume 1971 was used for the years 1960-1970.
20
Data analyzed in the study are available by contacting the authors.
21
An example of such a policy was the 1965 Official Language Bill, replacing English as the
official language in India with Hindi. Although the bill also required regulation to ensure that
the change would not cause any hardship to those who did not speak Hindi, the action
nonetheless sparked a series of riots in several Indian states by those opposed to the bill who
viewed it as a threat, as well as those who supported the bill and viewed its opponents as a
threat.
22
Due to the nature of the reports used for coding, it was not always possible to determine
whether a policy was passed by the state or national government, but it was possible to
determine whether it applied locally or nationally. We assume that many of the local policy
moves were passed by state authorities, and we were further able to distinguish clear national
policies that affected only a state (such as the Bombay reorganization bill of 1960 which
created two separate states). Thus, our analysis distinguishes local from national policy.
23
A second analysis was completed using Gross National Product (GNP) as the economic
indicator for the years 1965, 1970, 1975, 1980, 1985, 1990, and 1995. These were compared to
the outbreak of violence grouped in
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